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FAIR REPRESENTATION AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST:
SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMPLAINTS BETWEEN
CO-WORKERS
LORI

L. PARKt

In exchange for the abandonment of individual employee negotiations in the
workplace and the vesting of exclusive control over the grievance process to a
certified bargaining agent, unions members are owed a duty of fair
representation by their union. Given that the unions purpose is to foster the
greatest collective good, union members expect that they will sometimes have
to make individual sacrifices. However, where the subject of a workplace
grievance is a dispute between two individual union members, as in a
complaint of sexual harassment lodged by one bargaining unit member
against another, it is not clear where the greatest collective good lies. The
union, in the position of representing both the alleged victim and
perpetrator, is in a conflict of interest. This situation is further complicated by
the imposition of liability on unions for a failure to alleviate human rights
violations in the workplace. The author suggests one solution to this problem
is to allow a limited right of individual carriage of grievances in such
circumstances.
En echange contre !'abandon du pouvoir individuel de negociation de
l'employe et contre !'assignation de l'authorite exclusive de negocier !es griefs
a un agent certifie qui represente la collectivite des employes, les membres
d'un syndicat ont le droit d'etre representes de far;on equitable par leur
syndicat. Sacrifiant leurs interets individuels respectifs en vue de favoriser le
bien collectif, !es membres du syndicat jouent un role dans !'execution par le
syndicat de son obligation de representation. Cependant, lorsque le grief
emane d'une dispute entre deux membres individuels d'un meme syndicat,
comme par example, lorsqu 'une plainte d'harcelement sexuel est deposee par
un membre du syndicat contre un autre, le bien collectif devient moins bien
dr!fini. Le syndicat se retrouve dans une position de conflit d'intr!ret lorsqu 'il
doit representer a la fois la victime et !'accuse. Cette situation se complique
d'avantage lorsque !'on impose au syndicat la responsabilite d'allr!ger toute
infraction contre les droits de la personne sur !es lieux du travail. L 'auteur
suggere la solution d'octroyer un certain droit individuel limite aux employes
leur permettant de porter grief dans des circonstances semblables.

t B.A. (Acadia) 1990, LLB. anticipated 1997 (Dalhousie).
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the unique position of unions with regard to
their membership, and specifically the union's duty of fair
representation in the context of co-worker sexual harassment
complaints. It is argued that this context creates the possibility and
appearance of a conflict of interest for unions. The collectivist
approach that is paramount in the unionized workplace may not
facilitate an effective atmosphere for resolving individualist, coworker against co-worker claims, such as those filed as sexual
harassment grievances. This argument is developed through analogy
with the legal profession and a review of labour board duty of fair
representation decisions. The reaction of two national unions-the
Canadian Union of Postal Workers (cuPw) and the Canadian
Union of Public Employees (cuPE)-to sexual harassment
situations is examined. An argument for a modification of the
exclusivity of union control over contract administration is
advanced.

II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE
Sexual harassment, while often difficult to define or even to
recognize, exists as a problem in almost all work environments, both
unionized and non-unionized. Arguably, the problem has increased
with the widespread participation of women in the paid labour
force, particularly in traditional male dominated sectors. 1 This is an
unjust view, as it tends to portray sexual harassment as the problem
of its victims, whereas the responsibility lies squarely with the
perpetrators. There is an ever-increasing awareness of the effects of
sexual harassment on its victims and on the workplace, and

1

The author recognizes that while sexual harassment of men is possible and does
occur, the vast majority of its victims are women and the vast majority of harassers
are men. This has been documented by a variety of writers on this topic. See e.g. M.
A. Hickling, "Employer's Liability for Sexual Harassment" (1988) 17 Man. L.J.
124 at 127, where the author relates statistics on sexual harassment attesting to the
fact that a greater percentage of women experience sexual harassment at work, at a
higher frequency, than do men. The generalizations about the sex of both harasser
and victim which are made in this article are in no way intended to trivialize the
experiences of male victims of sexual harassment.
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hopefully, an ever-decreasing tolerance towards harassing
behaviours.
Although the phenomenon of sexual harassment obviously dates
back more than a few decades, 2 Canadian jurisprudence on sexual
harassment really began with the 1980 decision Bell v. Ladas.3 In
that case, Adjudicator Owen Shime held that harassing comments
and behaviours directed at women in the workplace by a male
supervisor constituted discrimination on the basis of sex under
Ontario human rights legislation. 4 This reasoning was picked up in
what is considered the leading Canadian case on sexual harassment,
Janzen v. Platy Enterprises, a decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada.5
Writing for the Court, Dickson C.J.C. canvassed a number of
academic commentators and judicial decision-makers, and found a
common theme in the many different definitions of sexual
harassment that existed:
Common to all of these descriptions of sexual
harassment is the concept of using a position ofpower to
import sexual requirements into the workplace thereby
negatively altering the working conditions of employees
who are forced to contend with sexual demands.
[emphasis added]6

In so stating, Dickson C.J.C. creates the impression that sexual
harassment can only be perpetrated by a person in an authority
position over the victim. To rely only on a workplace's formal
hierarchical power structure to identify and limit the potential
sources of sexual harassment would be to ignore practical reality.
Male influence and domination over women is not simply a

2

In her book, The Sexual Harassment of Women in the Workplace, 1600 to 1993
Qefferson: McFarland & Co., 1994), author Kerry Segrave discusses the impact of
sex discrimination and sexual harassment on working conditions for women from
the pre-Industrial Revolution era to the current decade. She concludes while the
topic has obviously received greater recognition in the recent past, employers and
male co-workers still blame the victim and many of the American legislative
"advances" have had little real impact on remedying the situations of women
victimized by sexual harassment.
3 (1980), 1 C.H.R.R. D/155 (Ont. Bd. oflnquiry).
4 Ibid. at D/156.
5 [1989] l S.C.R. 1252.
6 Ibid. at 1281.

124

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

function of job title or organizational status-it is derived from
cultural norms and messages, social conditioning, and a sexstereotyped belief system. As noted by Genevieve Eden in "Sexual
Harassment at Arbitration," 7 a man's economic power over the
women he works with is not born simply of formal authority. It is
also derived from "male rapport and camaraderie with supervisors
or from numerical and social dominance in male-dominated
workplaces." 8 Dickson C.J.C. seems to recognize these types of
arguments when he adopts his broad definition of sexual
harassment:
Without seeking to provide an exhaustive definition of
the term, I am of the view that sexual harassment in the
workplace may be broadly defined as unwelcome
conduct of a sexual nature that detrimentally affects the
work environment or leads to adverse job-related
consequences for the victims of the harassment. It is, as
Adjudicator Shime observed in Bell v. Ladas, and as has
been widely accepted by other adjudicators and
academic commentators, an abuse of power. When
sexual harassment occurs in the workplace, it is 'an abuse
of both economic and sexual power. Sexual harassment is
a demeaning practice, one that constitutes a profound
affront to the dignity of the employees forced to endure
it. By requiring an employee to contend with unwelcome
sexual actions or explicit sexual demands, sexual
harassment in the workplace attacks the dignity and selfrespect of the victim both as an employee and as a human
being. 9

Thus, as defined judicially, the potential for sexual harassment
certainly exists between co-workers within the same organizational
rank.
Incidents of sexual harassment can generally be placed into one
of two categories: quid pro quo, or poisoned work environment. 10
The quid pro quo type of harassment is a situation where an

(1993) Lab. Arb. Y.B. 117.
s Ibid at 120.
9 Supra note 5 at 1284.
10 Described alternatively as "sexual coercion" and "sexual annoyance," see A. P.
Aggarwal, Sexual Harassment: A Guide for Understanding and Prevention
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1992) at 22.
7
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employee is threatened with actual job consequences if she fails to
comply with a request for sexual favours. In the poisoned work
environment, the general atmosphere of the workplace is made
hostile or offensive, although there may not be any direct requests
for sexual services or threats of reprisal for failure to comply. 11
While Dickson C.J.C. rejected the necessity of categorizing or
characterizing instances of sexual harassment in this way,1 2 the
distinction may remain useful as a framework for understanding
the types and range of harassing events or episodes that can occur.
Complaints of co-worker harassment would typically fall into the
category of poisoned work environment, but there have been
examples of the quid pro quo type of harassment, even between
formally equal employees.13
Recognizing that sexual harassment at work is a serious problem
that can be inflicted on a worker even by her own colleagues; what
then is the appropriate function for a union in these situations?
Arjun Aggarwal identifies four different harassment scenanos
unions could potentially play a role in:
Situation No. 1: Harassment by a Supervisor
A member of the union has been sexually harassed by a
supervisor (who is not a member of the bargaining unit).
Situation No. 2: Harassment by a Client or a Customer
A member of the union has been sexually harassed by a
client or a customer of the employer.
Situation No. 3: Harassment by a Co-worker
A member of the union has been sexually harassed by a
co-worker, who is also a member of the same union.

11 D. A. Campbell, The Evolution of Sexual Harassment Case Law in Canada
(Kingston,: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1992) at 9.
12 Supra note 5 at 1283.
I3 See e.g. Canada Post Corp. and C. UP. W (1987), 27 L.A.C. (3d) 27 (Swan).
This case is particularly interesting because it involved a traditionally male locker room type environment, where the victim of sexual harassment initially
participated in the antics; yet the arbitrator recognized that even in such a context, it
was possible for some remarks to cross the line.
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Situation No. 4: Harassment by an Officer of the Union
(1) An employee of the union has been harassed by a
supervisor or manager (who is also an officer or agent of
the union).

(2) A member may also be harassed by a shop steward or
another union official. 14

The focus of this article is harassment by a co-worker (situation
No. 3) because it creates a difficult problem for union officials: how
does the union discharge the duty of fair representation owed to
each member of the bargaining unit where the members' interests
are diametrically opposed? 15 The union has a duty to the victim to
protect her against harassment and at the same time owes a duty to
the harasser to protect him against unfair discipline and/ or
discharge. The inherent conflict in this position is evident. A reexamination of the duty of fair representation in grievance handling
and its adequacy to protect both the complainants and perpetrators
of sexual harassment, where both are members of the bargaining
unit, should be undertaken.

III. UNION RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS PROTECTION

As the representatives of employee interests in the workplace,
unions bear a moral and a legal obligation to protect the safety and
dignity of bargaining unit members. The unions' role would appear
to extend to human rights recognition and protection as a logical
outgrowth of its historical raison d'etre-to protect workers from
exploitation. This would accord with the characterization of a union

14

Supra note IO at 112.

For the purposes of this article, the assumption is that the hypothetical
collective agreement, giving rise to grievance arbitration, contains a general antidiscrimination clause or specific prohibitions against sexual harassment. This
would make complaints of sexual harassment against a co-worker the proper
subject of a workplace grievance.
l5
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as "a tool or an instrument by which workers seek to achieve their
personal goals."16
The union's role of workplace human rights protector, per se,
becomes less clear-cut and not automatically assumed when
labour's values begin to collide. Unions are essentially political
institutions, dependent for survival and success on assuring the
satisfaction of the majority. Given this condition, there exists a
potential for the union to make politically expedient choices which
could either infringe the human rights of some workers or prevent
the development of more enlightened workplace policies and
practices. For example, as a servant of its membership, what role
does the traditional male-dominated union play in encouraging the
participation of women and assuring them job security? Can a
union justify the use of scarce resources to those ends where they
appear to serve a relatively small proportion of the constituency?
And, how does a union balance the imposition of human rights
standards 17 with the protection of traditional job rights, such as
seniority?
Some limits, aside from morality and social pressure, have been
placed on unions with respect to the protection of human rights on
the job. In several cases, boards of inquiry have held unions liable
for both direct and adverse effects discriminatory practices. 18 The
duty to accommodate, imposed primarily on the employer, has
been extended to unions by the Supreme Court of Canada. 19
In Renaudv. Central Okanagan School District 23, 20 the Supreme
Court of Canada held that a union could become a party to
discriminatory practices in the workplace in two ways: by creating

16 A. P. Aggarvval, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 2nd ed. (Toronto:
Buttervvorths, 1992) at 353.
17 For example, prohibitions on sexual harassment and affirmative action hiring
plans.
18 See e.g. Roosma v. Ford Motor Co. (1988), 9 C.H.R.R. D/4743; Gohm v.
Domtar(1990), 12 C.H.R.R. D/161.
19 On the duty to accommodate, see generally: Largev. Stratford (City), [1995] 3
S.C.R. 733; Central Alberta Dairy Poolv. Alberta (Human Rights Commission),
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 489; Ontario (Human Rights Commission) and O'Malley v.
Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536; McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3
S.C.R. 229; Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Saskatoon (City), [1989]
2 S.C.R. 1297.
20 [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970 [hereinafter RenaudJ.
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or contributing to the use of a discriminatory work rule or practice,
or by interfering with or preventing an employer's efforts to provide
reasonable accommodation to an employee adversely affected by a
work rule or practice. One provision of the collective agreement had
the effect of requiring the employee in question to work during a
particular time period, which was forbidden by his religion. The
employer school board was willing to alter the work schedule to
accommodate him, but the collective agreement required the
consent of the union to vary the schedule. The union refused to give
its consent to the employer's proposal. Ultimately, no other
solution was reached and the employee was terminated because he
would not work the shift at issue. The employee proceeded to
launch a complaint under the British Columbia Human Rights Act, 21
against both the school board and his own union.
One of the issues the Supreme Court of Canada addressed in
the case was:
Whether an employer or a labour union representing him
is under any duty to effect a reasonable accommodation
where, for reasons of religious belief, the employee is
unable to work a particular shift. [emphasis added] 22

In answering that question in the affirmative, the Court set the
stage for wider union responsibility in developing and maintaining
appropriate working conditions for those they represent. This
responsibility is not absolute. It is subject to the same bona fide
occupational requirements that an employer may resort to. A union
will be found in breach of its duty to accommodate where it refuses
to consent to reasonable accommodating efforts put forward by the
employer, or where it fails to suggest what it would consider to be
less onerous concessions. 23 Sopinka, J., writing for the Court,
emphasized that the union could not evade its responsibility for
upholding human rights in the workplace by passing it off to the
employer:
[A] union may be liable for failure to
accommodate ... notwithstanding that it did not
participate in the formulation or application of a

S.B.C. 1984, c. 22.
Renaud, supra note 20 at 981.
23 Renaud, supra note 20 at 992.

21
22
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discriminatory rule or practice. This may occur if the
union impedes the reasonable efforts of an employer to
accommodate. In this situation it will be known that
some condition of employment is operating in a manner
that discriminates ... against an employee and the
employer is seeking to remove or alleviate the
discriminatory effect. If reasonable accommodation is only

possible with the unions co-operation and the union blocks
the employer's efforts to remove or alleviate the
discriminatory effect, it becomes a party to the
discrimination . ... It cannot behave as if it were a
bystander asserting that the employee's plight is strictly a
matter for the employer to solve. [emphasis added] 24

This does not mean that the justificatory standard is a particularly
high one. In fact, the employer will be expected "to canvass other
methods of accommodation before the union can be expected to
assist in finding or implementing a solution." 2 5 Moreover, in
accordance with the reality that a union owes representational
duties to all of the employees in the bargaining unit, and not just to
those who are the objects of discrimination, the Court held that a
union will generally be justified in refusing its consent to changes
where the effect of those changes would mean "significant
interference" with the rights of the other members of the bargaining
unit. 26
Beyond the unions' ethical duty to help create a discriminationfree working environment, there is the spectre of joint liability with
the employer for failure to take, or consent to, the appropriate
actions.27 It is, therefore, vital that unions respond to real and
potential violations of human rights in the workplace.28

24
25

Renaud, supra note 20 at 991.
Ibid..
26 Ibid. at 991: "The duty to accommodate should not substitute discrimination
against other employees for the discrimination suffered by the complainant. Any
significant interference with the rights of others will ordinarily justify the union in
refusing to consent to a measure which would have this effect."
27 Unions have recognized the significance of the decision in Renaud, supra note
20. In an internal memo, dated 15 March 1993, directed at national representatives
of CUPE, solicitor John Elder wrote: "[T]he comments of the Court in Renaud
obviously apply to all groups who are protected from discrimination in human
rights legislation.... [T]he obligation of the union to participate in the attempt to
find a reasonable accommodation for the affected employee is clear. ... [T]his
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IV. THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
As a certified bargaining agent, the union has the authority (and
obligation) to negotiate with the employer with respect to working
conditions and terms of employment for all those who are part of
the bargaining unit. The employer is not at liberty to bargain with
its employees in the unit outside of the collective bargaining
structure, nor is the individual employee free to bargain on his or
her own behalf. If one characterizes the employment relationship
existing between those hiring and those hired, then the union is the
conduit through which employee concerns and demands, and
employer communications and offers, are transmitted. The duty of
fair representation developed from the origins of the labour
movement and its supporting legislation, which is the protection
and empowerment of the worker and not simply the creation of a
position of power for trade unions for their own sake.
Once a bargain is concluded, the union is charged with the
responsibility of administering the collective agreement on behalfof
the employees it represents. The control that unions exert over the
workplace is in the interests of the employees, collectively and
individually. Ideally, all unions would act with pure and proper
motives, and all employees would recognize and accept the purity
and propriety of those motives. But the reality is that unions are, at
least in some respects, political institutions. Since employees will
occasionally be inadequately protected (and/or will perceive that
decision is only the start of defining what the respective obligations of the employer
and the union may be in a particular circumstance."
See also Ottawa Labour Update (Vol. 5, No. l, Spring, 1995) at 37, Steve Waller
writes: "It is clear that unions must now be prepared to suspend the operation of
collective agreement provisions where the only person affected is the employee
requiring accommodation, and where no other reasonable method of
accommodation is available."
28 Most human rights legislation in Canada include provisions stating that an
employee must exhaust all avenues available to her through the workplace before a
human rights tribunal will hear the case. For instance the Canadian Human Rights
Act specifically states: "the Commission shall deal with any complaint filed with it
unless in respect of that complaint it appears to the commission that (a) the alleged
victim of the discriminatory practice to which the complaint relates ought to
exhaust grievance or review procedures otherwise reasonably available; ... "(R.S.C.
1989, c. H-6, s. 41 (a)). This seems to make it incumbent on unions to ensure
grievance procedures are fair and devoid of impediments to justice. If a person is
forced to go through the internal workplace procedures before seeking remedies
through human rights legislation, those procedures must be effective and just.
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they have been), arbitrators, courts, and legislators have recognized
that employees must have some means of safeguarding their own
interests. This necessity is underscored by the fundamental
economic importance of the employment relationship; for the
typical worker, a job is "that most valuable of his capital assets." 2 9
The means developed to protect employees' interest against
improper union action is the duty of fair representation.
Job interests are often protected through the grievance
arbitration process, generally set out in the collective agreement.
While a union member does not enjoy an absolute right to have her
grievance proceed to arbitration, she does enjoy the benefit of a
duty owed to her by her union that decisions regarding the carriage
of a grievance will be made fairly. Thus, the duty of fair
representation acts as a limit on the union's prerogative with respect
to the grievance arbitration process.3°
A doctrine which developed in the United States,3 1 the duty of
fair representation, is now firmly entrenched in Canadian labour
law.3 2 It is an explicit statutory duty in most Canadian
jurisdictions.33 Where reference to the duty is not specifically

29

P. Weiler, Reconcilable Differences (Toronto: Carswell, 1980) at 131.
P. Weiler, Governing the Workplace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1990) at 91. The duty of fair representation is not restricted to contract
administration or even contract negotiation. In Centre Hospitalier Regina Ltee v.
Labour Court, [1990) 1 S.C.R. 1330 [hereinafter Centre Hospitalier ], the Supreme
Court of Canada made reference to the fact that the duty extends up until the point
certification is lost.
3l See e.g. Steelev. Louisville & Nashville Railway Co., 323 u.s. 192 (1944); Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 u.s. 171 (1967). Paul Weiler, ibid. at 258, describes the emergence of
the duty in the u.s. as "expressly analogous to the obligation that the Constitution
imposes on the legislature."
32 The first Canadian application of the duty of fair representation was in Fisher
v. Pemberton (1969), 8 D.L.R.(3d) 521 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter Fisher].
33 Alberta, Labour Relations Code, S.A. 1988, c. L-1.2; British Columbia, Labour
Relations Code, R.B.C. 1992, c. 82; Canada, Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.
L-2; Manitoba, Labour Relations Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. LlO; Newfoundland, Labour
Relations Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. L-1; Ontario, Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.
L.2; Quebec, Labour Code, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-27; Saskatchewan, Trade Union Act,
R.S.S. 1978, c. T-17.
A typical example of the fair representation clause is found in the British
Columbia Act, s.12(1):
30

A trade union or Council of trade unions shall not act in a
manner that is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith a) in
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included in the relevant legislation, the Supreme Court of Canada
has held that it is an implied part of a union's obligations towards
those it represents.34
In the leading Canadian case of Canadian Merchant Service
Guild v. Gagnon,35 the union argued that it was up to it alone to
decide whether a grievance should proceed and therefore, Mr.
Gagnon did not have grounds to complain about its decision not to
proceed. The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that control over
the process resides with the union and therefore the union was not
liable to Gagnon on the facts of the case. But the Court found that
the union's discretion was subject to certain limits imposed through
the operation of the duty of fair representation. After surveying the
academic commentary, judicial and arbitral precedent, Chouinard
J. described the main principles of the duty of fair representation:
1. The exclusive power conferred on a union to act as
spokesman for the employees in a bargaining unit entails
a corresponding obligation on the union to fairly
represent all employees comprised in the unit.
2. When, as is true here and is generally the case, the
right to take a grievance to arbitration is reserved to the
union, the employee does not have an absolute right to
arbitration and the union enjoys considerable discretion.
3. This discretion must be exercised in good faith,
objectively and honestly, after a thorough study of the
grievance and the case, taking into account the
significance of the grievance and of its consequences for
the employee on the one hand and the legitimate
interests of the union on the other.
4. The union's decision must not be arbitrary, capricious,
discriminatory or wrongful.

representing any of the employees in an appropriate bargaining
unit, orb) in the referral of persons to employment, whether or
not the employees or persons are members of the trade union or a
constituent union of the council of trade unions.
34

Canadian Merchant Service Guildv. Gagnon, [1984) 1S.C.R.509 at 522, 526527 [hereinafter Gagnon].
35 Ibid
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5. The representation by the union must be fair, genuine
and not merely apparent, undertaken with integrity and
competence, without serious or major negligence, and
without hostility towards the employee.36

Thus, the duty of fair representation consists basically of an
obligation "to weigh the competing interests of the employees it
represents and make a considered judgment, the procedure and
results of which must neither be arbitrary, discriminatory, nor in bad
faith." [emphasis added] 37 The duty is a discretionary quid pro quo
for the individual rights employees have to sacrifice when a union is
certified to bargain on their behalf.
It has been suggested that Gagnon has left some confusion as to
the actual standard of care required of a union in discharging its
duty of fair representation to its membership. 38 This is particularly
true in those jurisdictions without a statutorily-defined duty, since
there would be an even greater dependence on the Court's
interpretation of the implied principles of the duty. One might
infer from Chouinard's J. comments that even where "serious or
major negligence" 39 had been established, a union might not have
breached the duty if there is an absence of bad faith. Referring to
the judgments of the lower courts, who faulted the union for an
inadequate investigation into the matter, he said:
With respect, I cannot see how the failure by the Guild to
undertake a 'substantive investigation' or a 'thorough
investigation' as the judges of the Superior Court and the
Court of Appeal respectively described it in indicating
the only fault they attributed to the Guild, can constitute
bad faith by the latter and make it liable to [the]
respondent. 40

A plain reading of this excerpt suggests the necessity of evidence of
bad faith to a finding of breach of the duty.

Supra note 34 at 527.
Bukvich v. Canadian Union of United Brewery, Flour, Cereal, Soft Drink and
Distillery Workers, Local 304, [1982] O.L.R.B. Rep. 35.
38 R. Bell, "A Union's Duty of Fair Representation" (Paper prepared for
Canadian Bar Association, New Brunswick Branch, January, 1993).
39 Supra note 36, per principle five.
40 Gagnon, supra note 35 at 534.
36
37
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The duty was considered again by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Gendron v. Supply and Services Union of the Public
Service Alliance of Canada, Local 50057. 41 In Gendron, four
employees applied for a job pursuant to an internal job posting. The
union and the employer had agreed on the criteria to be used in
assessing the applications. Gendron was successful and the other
three grieved on the basis that the procedure had not been
complied with properly. They were correct in their assertion and
the applications were re-assessed, resulting in Gendron being
displaced and ultimately laid off. He commenced an action against
his union in court, despite the fact he had been employed in a
jurisdiction with an express statutory duty of fair representation.
The Court held that the statutory duty could oust the common law
duty either expressly or by necessary implication, and that in those
instances, there would be no original jurisdiction in the courts to
hear a duty of fair representation claim. 42 The claim would only be
properly before the Canadian Labour Relations Board.
While addressing the union's dilemma when faced with a
conflict of interest between its membership (explored in more
detail in the next section), L'Heureux-Dube J. may have imposed a
different standard of conduct on the union than the one imposed in
Gagnon. As noted by Richard Bell, "although she had earlier
referred to the principles set out by Mr. Justice Chouinard in
Gagnon, her suggestion that liability would follow if the union does
not 'turn its mind' to all relevant considerations may impose a
higher standard than Gagnon." 43 Bad faith would not necessarily be
a part of the Gendron formulation of the duty test.44

41

[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1298 [hereinafter Gendron].
Interestingly, and of particular note to the topic of sexual harassment,
L'Heureux-Dube J. indicated that, while the common law duty would generally be
inapplicable where the statute contained a codified duty, it might not be the case
where human rights violations were at issue as that sort of breach "may not be
properly characterized exclusively as a labour relations matter." This leaves open
the possibility that a sexual harassment complainant alleging a breach of the duty of
fair representation could have a choice of forum. See Gendron, ibid. at 1320.
43 Supra note 38 at 4.
44 It is worthy of note that L'Heureux-Dube J., who wrote the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Gendron in 1990, also wrote the judgment of the
Quebec Court of Appeal in Gagnon, which was criticized by Chouinard J. in his
judgment in that case in 1984.
42
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While the duty will not be focused inward to scrutinize internal
union affairs, 4 5 it clearly applies to the way a union deals with
grievances and other employee complaints or demands. With
respect to the grievance process, a union's duties include:
i) investigate the facts of a grievance;
ii) listen to the grievor' s depiction of the events
surrounding the incident or problem in question;
iii) assess the strength and probability of success of the
grievance in an unbiased manner;
iv) keep the grievor informed and up-to-date regarding
the action being taken on her behalf;
v) avoid acting in a grossly negligent fashion m
representing the interests of the grievor; and
vi) obtain assistance as reasonably required considering
the gravity of the consequences for the grievor and the
resources the union has to rely on. 46

Nowhere in this list is an obligation to proceed to actual arbitration
of the grievance, though the likelihood that the duty may
encompass that step increases where critical interests are at stake.47
In Andre Cloutier and Cartage and Miscellaneous Employees' Union,
Local 931, 48 the Canada Labour Relations Board stated that "it goes
without saying that a grievance involving a situation where an
employee's career is on the line, demands the bargaining agent's full
attention and energy, more so than any other type of grievance." 49
One could contend that the critical job interest argument can be
raised on both sides of co-worker sexual harassment complaints.
The maintenance or establishment of a harassment-free workplace is

J. Christian, "The Developing Duty of Fair Representation" (1991) 2 Lab.
Arb. Y.B. 3 at 25.
46 Ibid at 20.
4 7 Union reaction to an employee's grievance will enjoy greater scrutiny where
that grievance concerns something of vital importance to the employee's career, the
most obvious example being employee discharge.
48 (1981), 40 di 222.
49 Ibid at 226.
45 T.
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critical to the complainant's job rights while the discipline imposed
on harassers affects their critical job interests, insofar as discipline
affects actual continued employment, significant suspensions, or
seniority entitlements.
One final note on the duty of fair representation relevant to the
co-worker sexual harassment scenario is that the duty contains both
procedural and substantive aspects. 50 Both the procedures which
must be adhered to (although not precisely defined) and the
ultimate outcome are important enough that either may lead to a
breach of the duty of fair representation.

V. CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The relationship between bargaining unit members and the union
that represents them is essentially one of dependence and trust. For
this reason some commentators have likened the duty of fair
representation to a fiduciary duty. George Adams states:
"[e]mployees can be considered to be the cestuis que trust and,
therefore, are owed a fiduciary duty of fair representation by the
trade union which is equivalent to the trustee of a trust." [emphasis
added] 51 In the Canadian Law Dictionary, fiduciary is defined as
follows:
Relating to or proceeding from trust or confidence. One
stands in a fiduciary relationship with regard to another
person when he has rights and powers he must exercise
for the benefit of that other person.5 2

The rules developed by the legal profession to prevent conflict
of interest, which is recognized as a breach of the fiduciary duty
between the solicitor and client, provide an interesting and useful
backdrop for an examination of conflict of interest in the unionized
workplace. 53 The Code of Professional Conduct of the Canadian Bar

50 G. Adams, Canadian Labour Law, 2nd ed. (Aurora.: Canada Law Book, 1995)
at 13-14.
51 Ibid. at 13-14.
52 ]. Yogis, Canadian Law Dictionary, 2nd ed. (New York: Barron's Educational
Series, 1990) at 90.
53 This analogy must be developed in the context of the qualification imposed on
the union's standard of conduct in
supra note 32 at 546: "[T]he standards of
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Association contains provisions to regulate a lawyer's actions when
dealing with conflict of interest between clients:
The lawyer shall not advise or represent both sides of a
dispute and, save after adequate disclosure to and with
the consent of the clients or prospective clients
concerned, shall not act or continue to act in a manner
when there is or is likely to be a conflicting interest. 54

The commentary following the rule declares that the reason for
the rule is "self-evident"-a lawyer's judgment and freedom of
action must be as free as possible from compromising influences so
as to not prejudice the interests of a client.
In a system where a union member's right to complain about
workplace conditions or discipline through the grievance procedure
is vested in his or her union, the potential for a conflict between
competing union member interests in a sexual harassment
complaint, or the appearance of one, exists and is a cause for
concern. The granting of exclusive rights to a union to negotiate
and administer collective agreements places the union in a position
of responsibility for the employees it represents. Accordingly, it
should be obliged to administer its duties for the benefit of
bargaining unit members, not for its own advantage as an
independently-existing organization. This requires its decisions not
be motivated by self-interest, and full disclosure where interests of
representees would appear to conflict. Both union members deserve
unbiased and effective representation, free from the conflict of
interest inherent in representing both sides of a dispute. This is
particularly true given the exclusive nature of the bargaining rights
granted to unions under the legislative framework, and given the
fact that union members are generally afforded no right to carry
their own grievances.55
a professional advocate cannot be imposed upon the union officials who were
involved."
54 Canadian Bar Association, Code ofProfessional Conduct, 1988, at 17.
55 Bargaining unit members typically have no right to bring their own grievances
to arbitration unless specific provision is made for it in the collective agreement.
Even where trade union legislation would appear on its face to accord employees
the right to proceed with a grievance, independent of union consent or involvement,
the courts have not interpreted this to mean that an employer has an obligation to
deal with any grievance presented aside from the mechanism in the collective
agreement. See e.g. Lunenberg Police Association v. Town ofLunenberg (1980), 118
D.L.R.(3d) 590 (N.S.S.C. A.D.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused.
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Even if a single union representative was able to represent the
conflicting interests of union members in a sexual harassment
complaint without prejudice, this does not address the issue of
appearance of fairness. Not only must a union actually follow
correct procedures and arrive at appropriate decisions, but the
union's procedures and decisions must be seen to be correct and
appropriate by those they affect. This is necessary to foster a sense
of satisfaction among members with the union's performance,
thereby ensuring its continued survival, and also encourage
acceptance of decisions and settlements once they are reached.
L'Heureux-Dube J., writing for the Court in Gendron, expressly
recognized that unions will often find themselves in situations
where the interests of those they represent are in conflict. In these
circumstances, the union cannot be expected to completely satisfy
all involved and, indeed, the duty does not require it. The Court
addressed this situation in the following terms:
In a situation of conflicting employee interests, the union

may pursue one set of interests to the detriment of another
as long as its decision to do so is not actuated by any of the
improper motives described above, and as long as it turns its
mind to all the relevant considerations. The choice of one
claim over another is not in and of itself objectionable.
Rather, it is the underlying motivation and method used
to make this choice that may be objectionable. [emphasis
added] 56

In an appeal heard the same day as Gendron, the Supreme
Court of Canada again touched on the issue of conflict of interests
within the bargaining unit.57 However, in Centre Hospitalier, the
Court's underlying premise for the development of the duty is that
the conflict, where it exists, will be between an individual employee
and the interests of the bargaining unit as a whole.5 8 The analysis

5 6 Gendron, supra note 41 at 1328-1329. The motives referred to include
personal hostility, political revenge, dishonesty, and unequal treatment of employees
on such factors as race, sex, or personal favoritism, see Rayonier Canada (B. C.) Ltd.
and International Woodworkers of America, Local 1-217, [1975] 2 Can. L.R.B.R.
196 at 201-202 (B.C.L.R.B.).
57 Centre Hospitalier, supra note 30.
58 Centre Hospitalier, supra note 30 at 1347: "The duty of fair representation
raises thorny problems where, as here, by its very function the union has an
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does not include those situations where the conflict is derived from
the competing interests of two individual members of the same
bargaining unit. Thus, it could be argued that the rules and
standards for assessing conflicts of interest in the context of the
cases considered at the Supreme Court of Canada are not relevant
per se to situations of co-worker harassment.
Even going back to the basic principles in Gagnon, on which
these cases were based, the solution is still unclear. 59 Can a union be
fair in its representation of conflicting interests of its constituencies
where the cause of complaint is derived from within that
constituency? How does a union demonstrate integrity in the
dispute resolution process when it effectively represents both sides
of a dispute? Given that a union can potentially be held liable for
human rights infringements, either directly or by virtue of their
duty to accommodate, perhaps their first responsibility is to protect
the victim of harassment. If that is the case, the alleged harasser
may have serious and well-founded doubts as to the fairness and
genuineness of the representation he receives.

VI. PRACTICAL APPLICATION-BOARD
DECISIONS AND UNION STRATEGY

1. Board Decisions
There are obviously a great many cases, reported and unreported,
which address the duty of fair representation and the problems of
its application in various fact situations. Proceeding from the
generalization that the statutory and implied duties have the same
practical effects and content, the following analysis of arbitration
and labour board decisions illustrates some of the difficulties that
arise with exclusive union control over grievance arbitration. The
problem is exacerbated by the relatively low standard of practice

obligation to defend the interests of members of the bargaining unit as a whole, as
well as those of an individual employee."
59 Among the principles comprising the duty of fair representation stated in the
case was: "The representation by the union must be fair, genuine and not merely
apparent, undertaken with integrity and competence, without serious or major
negligence, and without hostility towards the employee," Fisher, supra note 32 at

527.
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and procedure required for unions to fulfill the requirements of the
duty of fair representation.6°
The complaint in Abdel Elejel61 was that union officials
breached the duty of fair representation when they refused to allow
Elejel' s complaint to go to arbitration because the union officials
who refused to send the grievance to arbitration were the ones who
instigated the actions which led to the complaint. The Ontario
Labour Relations Board characterized the official's attempt to both
accuse and defend the grievor on the same fact situation as an
unacceptable conflict of interest. The grievance was referred back to
arbitration and the union was ordered to provide the grievor with
independent counsel. The union's control over the process in this
case did not lead to a more efficient resolution or allocation of
union resources. This undermines one argument that might be
offered to support the exclusive vesting of control over the
grievance process to the union, namely the efficient use of scarce
resources.
In Richard Findlay and Brewery, Winery, and Distillery Workers'
Union, Local 300, 62 the complainant had been employed at Molson
for almost twenty years when he was terminated from his
employment. He launched a grievance of his termination, which
was withdrawn by the union before arbitration. The union had
made attempts to set up the arbitration to his satisfaction, but he
was unable to agree with their approach. The union refused to allow
him to proceed to arbitration with his own counsel because it would
undermine union control and have a negative impact on future
grievances for them. The Industrial Relations Council did not
consider this to be a breach of the duty, partly because allowing
him to proceed with what the union considered an un-winnable
grievance would be a waste of resources. Left open to question is
how a three-party duty of fair representation hearing can be
considered more resource-efficient than a single arbitration?
60 The author recognizes, however, that the forum for hearing duty of fair
representation complaints is different and the remedies for breach vary accordingly.
The purpose of this description is not a specific examination of legislative
provisions (or lack thereof) or of the remedies granted by the boards and courts, but
is intended to give the reader a general sense of some of the shortcomings of the duty
where conflicts of interest arise.
61 [1985] O.L.R.B. Rep. Qune) 841.
62 [1990] B.C.L.B. C144/90 (Q.L.).
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Ed Cherak and General Truck Drivers and Helpers Union, Local
No. 3163 was a reconsideration of an earlier B.C. Industrial Relations
Council decision that found the union in question to be in breach of
its statutory duty. The Council reconsidering the case held that a
union can breach the duty of fair representation even where a
grievance is referred to arbitration if the union has not done
adequate preparatory work or investigation, or if it is in a clear
conflict of interest with the grievor existed, even where there is no
bad faith. This illustrates how complicated the duty can be, both
for the union and the employee. The multiplicity of applications
and hearings required if an employee seeks to protect his or her job
rights to the fullest extent suggests that a more simplified approach
may be in order.
Following the decision in Ed Cherak, the union's investigation
of a sexual harassment grievance on the part of a complainant
employee arguably compromises the outcome of the harasser's
potential grievance and might lead to a breach of the duty based on
a conflict of interest. Even if represented by different shop
stewards, the union would still ultimately be the party investigating
on behalf of one member, necessarily to the detriment of another
member. This suggests an alternative approach to the resolution of
co-worker complaints is necessary.
In Darius L 'Heureux and Civic Service Union No. 52, 64 the
Alberta Labour Relations Board held that the duty of fair
representation extends past the actual arbitration of the grievance to
encompass the union's actions in seeking, and during judicial review
of the arbitration decision. In that case, the union was seeking a
review because they had been ordered to pay compensation to the
grievor. The Board found a breach of the duty where the union had

63 [1990] B.C.L.B. C202/90 (QL) [hereinafter Ed Cherak]; see also Fritz
Steisslinger and United Association ofJourneymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing
and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, Local No. 170, [ 1991]
B.C.L.B. C23 l/9 l (QL), which involved an application to set aside a decision that
had found the union which had provoked the applicant's termination by the
employer had breached its duty. The B.C. Industrial Relations Council considered
the decision in Ed Cherak where the Council had stated that a union could breach
the duty if it stood in a clear conflict of interest with the grievor, or if in
investigating a grievance, the union's conduct compromised the outcome of the
arbitration.
6 4 [1993] Alta. L.R.B.R. 556.
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proceeded to judicial review without disclosing their conflict of
interest with the grievor. The Board seems to have left open the
option of allowing the review as long as they advised the grievor of
the conflict of interest that the review created.
The idea that a union would even seek review of a decision that
was favourable to an employee it represented calls into question the
union's motive. Arguably, the union was protesting a decision
favourable to one in furtherance of the interests of the majority of
the bargaining unit. The question is how satisfactory a response is
that to the individual employee who has given up independent
control in favour of the protection the union is expected to provide?
In Steven Blanchard and United Steelworkers of America, Local
No. 935, 65 the complainant (Blanchard) was discharged from his
employment and initiated a grievance. Before the arbitration was
heard, the union withdrew on the advice of its lawyer. In return for
withdrawing, the union obtained a cash settlement for Blanchard
and a letter of reference from the employer. Blanchard was seeking
reinstatement and complained that the union had breached his
right to fair representation. The Industrial Relations Council agreed
with his assertion that there was a conflict of interest. Evidence of
conflict was the union's good relationship with the employer, the
low number of grievances, and that the union may have been
seeking to protect its own reputation, as Blanchard had been
accused of indiscretions involving alcohol and sex with minors.
However, this conflict of interest was not enough to find a breach
of the duty of fair representation; the Council dismissed
Blanchard's complaint. This case demonstrates that where a union
drops a termination grievance to maintain its own harmonious
relationship with the employer, it might not necessarily breach the
duty. If the self-interest of a union trumps such an important
individual interest-the actual employment in this case-then the
duty of fair representation must be seen as offering little
meaningful protection.
Dutcher v. Construction and General Labourers and General
Workers, Local No. I 079" 6 involved a consideration of the implied
duty of fair representation. The plaintiff Dutcher had been laid off
by his employer and his union refused to proceed to arbitration on

65
66

[1989] B.C.L.B. C106/89 (QL).
(1990), 110 N.B.R.(2d) 368 (Q.B.).
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his grievance. The Court held that this was not a breach of the duty
because there had not been misrepresentations made to the plaintiff
and because the union's discretion had been exercised in good faith.
Regardless of how procedurally correct the union's
consideration of his case may have been, it is questionable whether
Dutcher found great comfort in that knowledge. Where the very
continuation of the employment relationship is at stake, it seems
rather patronizing to expect an employee to be satisfied with
procedures that let his compensated and exclusive representative,
his union, opt out of a full hearing of his claim.
In Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union, Local 75
and Toronto Hilton, 67 the complainant alleged a breach of the duty
on the grounds that the union had failed to seriously consider her
complaints about scheduling and seniority calculation, and had
failed to file grievances on her behalf. She claimed that the union
steward did not file her grievances because the steward stood to
benefit from the scheduling and seniority procedures of which the
grievor complained. This, she argued, was a conflict of interest.
At paragraph 50 of the decision, the Ontario Labour Relations
Board quoted its earlier decision in Savage Shoes.
'Bad faith' and 'discriminatory,' ... test for the presence,
in the process or results of union decision-making, of
factors which should not be present. 'Arbitrary,' on the
other hand, describes the absence in decision-making of
those things which should be present.6 8

The Hilton Board added that it found the element of conflict of
interest in the case "most troubling:"
Although the fact that a union representative is somewhat
involved in an issue will not always create a conflict of
interest, such situations can cause perception problems at
the very least. A steward who may be in a position of
conflict of interest with a person complaining will seldom
give the appearance of fairness to a member, no matter
how well reasoned the response. 69

[1992) 0.L.R.D. No. 2113 [hereinafter Hilton].
6s [1983] O.L.R.B. Rep. (Dec) 2067.
69 Supra note 67 at para. 57.

67
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Conflict of interest between the union and the individual
employee was also at issue in Ronald K J Mah and Canadian Union
of Postal Workers.7° Mah alleged a breach of the duty of fair
representation for the union's refusal to process his overtime
grievance. The conflict of interest arose because the grievance
officer's wife was the main beneficiary of the overtime allotment
being grieved. On reconsideration, the federal Board upheld its
original decision that there was a breach of the duty. They held that
the official should have removed himself from the situation, but that
it was not necessary to fulfill the duty owed to the grievor.
Presumably, the union could have easily had another representative
deal with the grievor's complaint, but even this minimal level of
accommodation was not required.
In Dianne L. Anderson and the Manitoba Government
Employees' Association,7 1 the applicant Anderson was the successful
candidate in a job competition. An unsuccessful candidate sought
union support for an appeal of the decision, which was granted.
When the applicant also sought union representation for the appeal
hearing, it was refused because the union contended that it could
not represent both members in the same matter. The Manitoba
Board agreed. It held that representing both parties would have
been a conflict of interest, and therefore a breach of the duty of fair
representation. In choosing not to represent the applicant, the Board
found the union could only have breached of the duty of fair
representation if its decision was arbitrary or discriminatory, which
was not the case on its facts.
This is a relatively low threshold for the union to meet in order
to justify the refusal of services to which an employee would
otherwise be entitled. According to this decision, it is acceptable to
deny representation or to refuse to proceed with a grievance if the
union decides the grievance is without merit or if it would be
detrimental to the bargaining unit to do so. The emphasis is on the
collective good of the unit, over individual access to what might be
considered justice. When placed in the context of sexual
harassment, the issue is whether this emphasis accords sufficient
protection to human rights in the workplace, on the one hand, and
serious individual consequences on the other. It is not an acceptable

?O
71

(1991), 86 di 27.
[1990] M.L.B.D. No. 5 (QL).
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solution to a conflict of interest problem to simply deny
representation, and a forum to one side of the dispute.
Finally, in Wayne Hamilton and Edmonton Police Association,n
the Alberta Labour Relations Board found there had not been a
breach of the duty in the union's refusal to advance a termination
grievance even though the union did not personally interview the
grievor. The membership vote not to proceed with the grievance
was ruled sufficient consideration of the complaint in the
circumstances.
This decision raises questions about the possibility of bargaining
unit popularity contests. If membership votes are seen as adequate
protection for individual rights, there is the potential for unfairness.
For instance, if the grievor brings an unpopular claim, or the person
whose conduct is complained of is well-liked, the membership is
not likely to back the grievance. This is an important concern for
co-worker sexual harassment complaints. As a relatively new (and
often controversial) subject for the grievance process, it might not
be considered important enough for allocation of grievance
resources. In the traditionally male workplace, there might be a
general desire among the membership to suppress such claims out
of animosity towards the intrusion of women, or out of a desire to
protect their own kind. The potential for such "internal workplace
politics" was expressly recognized by the leadership of one national
union.7 3
2. Union Strategy

Some unions have explicitly recognized the potential difficulty
posed by conflict of interest in handling complaints of co-worker
harassment. Writing as president of Canadian Union of Public
Employees (CUPE), Canada's largest union, Judy Darcy remarked
that the union had initially concentrated on harassment by
supervisors when sexual harassment "emerged" as a workplace issue,
(consistent with the formal power assumptions about sexual
harassment discussed in the first section) but:
[I] t quickly became apparent that sexual harassment had
other manifestations as well, such as harassment between

n [1995] Alta. L.R.B.R. 315.
73

Darcy, infta note 74.
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co-workers .... In the latter case, the lines are less clearly
drawn than in those involving supervisors. The union is
obligated to represent the complainant and the alleged
harasser as part of the duty of 'fair representation'
outlined in federal and most provincial labour legislation.
The situation gets even more complicated when you
throw in internal workplace politics, friendships and
loyalties that can have other workers taking different
sides .... How can the union adequately represent the
interests of both parties in a complaint? Are special
complaint procedures necessary, and if so, what should
they look like? 74

Darcy suggests one solution might be to assign different staff
representatives to each of the parties. However, recognizing the
drain on union resources this would entail, she proposes another
alternative which would stream sexual harassment complaints made
against co-workers into an internal union complaint system, thus
eliminating the need for employer involvement.75 This might be
particularly short-sighted solution in that it ignores the employer's
responsibility and ultimate control over the workplace. It is
questionable how fair a completely intra-organizational process
would even be, given the "internal workplace politics, friendships
and loyalties that can have other workers taking different sides" she
identifies.76 Thus, neither of her suggestions are perfect solutions.
CUPE has, however, designed strategies and policies to guide
them through the tricky issue of grievances arising out of sexual
harassment between co-workers. CUPE's Harassment Awareness Kit
includes a specific resource kit entitled Co- Worker Sexual
Harassment.77 The approach is progressive in that it clearly links the
concept of union solidarity with the importance of addressing
sexual harassment in the workplace. Professing a comprehensive
commitment to the equality of women, CUPE states:

74

J. Darcy, "Sexual Harassment-Unions at Work" in Geller-Schwartz,

From

Awareness to Action (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1993) at 132.

Ibid at 133.
Ibid at 132.
77 Equal Opportunities Department, Canadian Union of Public Employees,
April 1992 [hereinafter Co- Worker Sexual Harassment}.
75
76
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The best strategy in this matter for us as trade unionists is
to have an impact on the workplace: making
management aware of the problem, making employees
aware of the issue (and aware of their rights under
legislation and under their collective agreement), and
training local union officers and stewards to deal with the
problem in the context of their workplaces and within
our own structures. 78

In discussing the particular problems posed by co-worker sexual
harassment, CUPE indicates that the human rights process, and the
grievance arbitration process under the collective agreement are two
possible avenues of redress for its victims. Arguably, cu PE
recognizes that the human rights process means less money and
effort would have to be expended by the union, but they are wary
about giving up control of the rights assurance process: "[the]
grievance procedure is the first and foremost legal avenue available
to union members to deal with workplace harassment, including
member to member sexual harassment ... human rights process
need not be, and should not be, used as an alternative to the
grievance procedure. " 79 But CUPE also acknowledges that the
grievance process has not proven itself perfectly suited to the
resolution of sexual harassment cases:
In theory the complaint is against the employer because it
is the employer's responsibility to maintain a workplace
free of sexual harassment. In practice the complaint can
be perceived by everyone involved as a dispute between
two union members. In dealing with the complaint, the
employer takes on the role of arbitrator and the Union
seems to get caught in the middle. 80

What creates the feeling of being "caught in the middle" 1s the
reality that conflict of interest exists in these scenarios.
The document provides information about the grievance
process in light of the fact that the union owes a duty to both the
harasser and his victim. The process set out for the victim to follow
is, generally, to contact a resource person and document the case.

78 Harassment Awareness Kit, Equal Opportunities Department, Canadian
Union of Public Employees, October 1991.
79 Co-Worker Sexual Harassment, supra note 77 at 13.
80 Ibid. at 4.
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On the basis that CUPE locals operate under different collective
agreements they advise a complainant:
You do not have to have a specific harassment clause in
your collective agreement in order to file a grievance. If
your contract contains a "No Discrimination" article or
even a broad "Health and Safety" clause, you can grieve
under either one of those. 81

With respect to the alleged harasser, union representatives have
an obligation to advise him that he has the following rights:
To obtain details of the alleged harassment from the
employer as quickly as possible;
0

To contact his shop steward, local union executive
member or staff representative immediately to find out
his rights;
0

" If fired or suspended without pay, prior to a completed
investigation, file a grievance on the disciplinary action;
" If suspended with pay or moved to another work
location pending investigation, accept the employer's
action until the report of the investigation is available;
and
"Even if proven guilty, the alleged harasser's discipline as
meted out by the employer could in some cases be
considered too severe and a grievance initiated. 82

The other component of CUPE's strategy is aimed at workplace
education. This is certainly desirable, and even necessary for the
eradication of the problem, but it does not address the problems of
fairness, bias, and adequate representation in the grievance process
itself, which, as noted, the union considers the primary vehicle for
resolution of these complaints.
CUPE's strategy is not more specific than this. There are no
defined responses to the conflicts of interest inherent in co-worker
harassment. The fact that CUPE considers it necessary to have a
strategy to deal with the issue, and that the duty of fair

8!
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Co-Worker Sexual Harassment, supra note 77 at 8.

Ibid. at 9-10.

THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION

149

representation can be inferred from their material, indicates they
should be aware the problem exists.
Another national union that has demonstrated a significant
interest in dealing with the issues surrounding sexual harassment in
the workplace is the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (curw).
They too link the issues surrounding sexual harassment to the
general principle of solidarity in the union movement.
curw operates on a nation-wide collective agreement, so all
their membership has recourse to the same provision (Article 56)
when complaining of sexual harassment on the job. This article
includes a definition of harassment, provisions to maintain
confidentiality, and other more general guarantees governing rights
to file grievances.
curw produced, as part of a package of materials for shop
stewards (parts of which are also distributed to the entire
membership), a training handout. 83 It provides general information
about the nature and types of sexual harassment faced by their
membership. The handout also includes step by step procedures for
handling investigations and grievance processing for both the
alleged harasser and the victim of the harassing behaviour. The
more notable provisions of these procedures are:
i) in investigating complaints, stewards are advised not to disclose
the problem to the supervisor or to the person accused of
harassment;
ii) if someone must be moved out of the situation, it should not be
the complainant who suffers;
iii) if the steward is representing the complainant, he or she must
find another union representative to represent the alleged harasser;
and
iv) if appropriate, ask the alleged harasser if he would consider
apologizing to the complainant, but stress that may not resolve the
problem. 84

83 CUPW Atlantic Region, (Materials prepared for CUPW National Education
Program during 1993-96 term) [unpublished].
84 Ibid
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In all, CUPW provides its stewards with five pages of specific
procedures, based on the collective agreement, to guide the sexual
harassment complaint process. The union also provides fairly
detailed information to its members about their rights as
individuals suffering harassment or being accused of committing it.
It explicitly recognizes the difficulty of union conflict of interest by
providing that the complainant and alleged harasser will receive
separate union representation. But does this go far enough to justify
the exclusive nature of the control that the union enjoys, or to
guarantee fairness in representation and/or the appearance of
fairness?
Separate representation is not a guarantee of unbiased
representation. For example, both representatives could easily be a
part of the same workplace as the employees involved, and
therefore affected by the prevalent mood of the shop floor. There
may be consultation between the representatives, creating a single
approach to the problem, with only the appearance of a dual
approach. The effect of setting out an elaborate sexual harassment
policy might confer on the complainants an implied primacy of
rights vindication, which could affect the attitudes with which the
harasser's subsequent grievance is approached.
Despite admittedly close attention and apparent commitment
to the issues at stake, these problems, as well as the others implicit
in a situation where one body represents both sides of a dispute,
remain unsolved by the unions' strategies.

VII. CONCLUSION: SUGGESTION FOR CHANGE
In his article, "The Developing Duty of Fair Representation," 8 5
Timothy Christian sets out the competing viewpoints developed by
Professors Archibald Cox and Clyde Summers regarding whether
collective or individual rights should predominate in the workplace.
Cox's argument, supporting the collective rights theory, is based on
the notion that allowing individuals independent access to the
grievance process weakens the union's position in the workplace. He
argues that arbitration rights must be vested exclusively in the union
in order to:
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• permit the development of comprehensive strategies
and consistency in arbitration rulings;
" bolster the status of unions;
encourage settlement of grievances short of actual
arbitration; and
0

• facilitate ease of operation of the process. 86

The opposite, individualist view of Summers is based on the
idea that allowing individual employees to pursue their own
grievances fosters the ultimate purpose of labour legislation-to
provide benefits to those individual employees. 87 To refuse them
that right is therefore incompatible with the broader goals and
objectives of unionization in the first place.
As can be seen from a review of recent Canadian cases (most
notably, the Supreme Court of Canada decisions in Gagnon and
Gendron), and also from a review of Canadian collective bargaining
legislation (most examples of which contain an explicit duty of fair
representation), the collectivist approach is paramount in the
workplace. The union's control over grievance arbitration is virtually
absolute, although mitigated somewhat by its concurrent duty to
fairly represent the interests of its workplace constituency.
However, it is not necessarily logical to extend this duty, and its
accompanying exclusivity of rights, to cases of co-worker sexual
harassment.
From the general discussion of the duty of fair representation
and the practical effects of conflicts of interest within the
bargaining unit, it is evident that the current approach has
developed to deal with situations where the competing interests at
stake in the bargaining unit are individual versus collective. The
duty was not developed to deal with situations where the internal
bargaining unit conflict of interest is between individuals. For
example, in a grievance about seniority rights, the union balances
the interests of the employee launching the grievance, with the
collective interests of the bargaining unit as a whole, since an
adjustment in seniority of one impacts on the respective ranking of
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all others. However, when one employee launches a grievance on the
basis that she has been sexually harassed by another employee in the
same bargaining unit, the union is in the position of having to weigh
those competing individual claims against each other.
Further support for the proposition that the duty's application
to internal union conflicts of interests was developed outside the
context of competing individual claims can be found in Centre
Hospita!ier. 88 In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that
the duty of fair representation as it applied to a union's handling of
a grievance can be described as a two stage analysis:
First, the union must carefully consider the merits of the
grievance to decide whether it should be taken to
arbitration. At this stage, the existence of a conflict
between the interests of the employee involved in the
grievance and those of the employees in the bargaining
unit as a whole would seem unlikely. At the second
stage, if the union decides that the grievance has merit, it
must represent the employee without serious negligence,
discrimination or bad faith at all subsequent stages of the
grievance procedure. The case at bar is at this second
stage and it is here that conflicts between an employee
and the bargaining unit represented by the union are
most likely to occur. 89

The language employed here indicates that a conflict between the
individual interests of members of the bargaining unit was not in
contemplation when the Court held it appropriate to apply the
standard duty of fair representation test to internal conflicts. This
indicates there is a need to examine the assumed application of the
duty in those situations.
Is good faith consideration (to over-simplify the test) a high
enough standard to impose on a union where it is potentially in the
position of having to choose to represent one member and not
another? 90 The duty of fair representation would not appear to be
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This generalization is not intended to deny the fact that there is a collective
interest in non-discrimination or in seeing discipline fairly administered. However,
the emphasis for the purpose of this argument is on the more direct interests at
stake.
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required in order to vindicate or protect the union's role as
protector of the masses, nor does not seem necessary to safeguard
the union's status or authority. Indeed, it is inconsistent with the
union's responsibility as representative of each of the employees
involved, and with labour's (arguable) commitment to workplace
democracy. It is argued that the sort of control involved with such
an exercise of power functions to inject another unacceptable layer
of domination over the ordinary worker's life. This is at the heart of
what Ian Hunter contends in his article, "Individual and Collective
Rights in Canadian Labour Law."9 1 Recognizing the important role
unions play in providing a greater measure of equality of bargaining
power through collective action, Hunter believes that the absolute
nature of the exclusive rights unions have been granted with respect
to the work force may no longer be warranted. He states:
What may be lost ... are the rights of the individual
worker, particularly the worker who dissents from the
activities of 'his' union. The individual member's
subservience to union decisions is compelled by judicial
deference to the union's perceived need for 'effective
bargaining authority' and 'internal solidarity.' It may be
argued that the degree of subservience was conditioned
by turn-of-the-century circumstances which no longer
apply; that compelled solidarity is not real solidarity, and
that unions in the long run do not gain from such
compulsion; even that a consequence is to make unions
another layer of control over workers' lives, a sort of
'secondary management' rather than the intended
liberating force. 92

In the end, the reasonable solution to the problems raised by
workplace complaints, such as sexual harassment grievances lodged
by one co-worker against another, may be to allow employees a
limited right to carry their grievances to arbitration. In fact, it is
entirely possible to arrive at this conclusion in consideration of the
proposition that the duty of fair representation did not develop in
the context of direct conflicts between competing individual claims
and remembering that the underlying purpose of the collective
bargain structure is the protection of workers' rights.
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The idea of giving workers just such a limited right has long
been advocated by Paul Weiler where critical job interests,
particularly continued employment, are at stake. 93 The central
importance the job holds for most people makes it deserving of
such special status. Even if one was to argue sexual harassment
claims could not be considered critical interests, there are other
reasons to include them within the scope of the limited individual
right. A union's duty to accommodate includes finding solutions to
human rights violations, which is compatible with flexibility in
grievance carriage. In fact, allowing individual carriage could be
called one method of accommodation, particularly where a claim
would not otherwise be advanced.
Secondly, individual grievance carriage provides a better option
than private and potentially harmful internal union processes, and
has been advanced by large and influential unions such as CUPE.9 4
Channelling co-worker sexual harassment claims through an
internal mechanism has the potential to reduce an employer's sense
of responsibility for sexual harassment on the job; to create an
attitude of secrecy which could serve to protect perpetrators and
vilify victims; and actually decrease individual access to justice since
the limited right of fair representation does not apply to internal
union affairs.
Professor Bernard Adell argues that any employee grievances
should be subject to the option of individual carriage.95 While some
of his supporting arguments are compelling, and are applicable to
the position advocated here, 96 to argue for such a broad individual
right ignores the legal authority with which the exclusivity of
grievance carriage issue has been considered and expounded. The
difference with the limited right proposed in the circumstances
surrounding co-worker sexual harassment however, is that the

93 Supra note 29 at 138.
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95 "Collective Agreements and Individual Rights: A Note on the Duty of Fair

Representation" (1986) 11 Queen's L.J. 251.
96 For example, the argument that exclusive union control is needed on the basis
of resource allocation efficiency (ibid. at 255) is countered by the heavy costs
attendant on duty of fair representation proceedings. In fact, the burden imposed on
the parties subject to the process has been considered so taxing that in a report to the
B.C. Minister of Labour, Recommendations for Labour Law Reform (1993) at 29,
the writers of suggest that a new and less onerous process needs to be developed.
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unique individual-versus-individual context can be distinguished
from the contexts of the cases in which exclusivity principles were
developed.
The vesting of exclusive control over the contract
administration processes in the union had to have been intended, at
least in part, to foster greater protection of workers' rights through
a unified stance and support of union authority and credibility.
Unfortunately, in the case of co-worker sexual harassment
complaints, this exclusivity has the potential to run counter to this
goal. Allowing a limited right of individual carriage of grievances
would serve to add another avenue of protection for the rights of
aggrieved employees, without having to endure the unnecessary
step of making a fair representation complaint. This process could
improve members' perception of the union, since individual
grievances would rarely come before a union who diligently
assessed grievances and presented them on behalf of its
membership. Furthermore, the individuals proceeding to
arbitration on their own would not enjoy a high success rate, if the
union was correct in its initial assessment of the grievance's merit.
The protection of human rights and of crucial job interests are
compelling enough reasons to justify an infringement on the union's
control of the grievance process. The individual employee cannot
and should not be expected to compromise his or her interests in
these areas for the perceived collective good. Simply put, there is
too much at stake.

